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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JOHN C. CRITCHLOW and 
SOPHIA CRITCHLOW, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and LOIS 
CRITCHLOW, his wife; FUNNON T. 
SHIMMIN and DONNA SHIMMIN, his 
wife; and VERA SHIMMIN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JOHN C. CRITCHLOW and 
SOPHIA CRITCHLOW 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by appellants seeking to estab-
lish an easement and right of way for vehicle, animal and ped-
estrian travel over land belonging to the respondents, under 
the theory of prescriptive right as to the respondents 
SHIMMIN and under the theory of a way of necessity as to 
the respondents CRITCHLOW. Appellants also seek damages 
for the blocking of such claimed easement and right of way 
by respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below, sitting without a jury, ruled that 
appellants did not have an easement by prescription over the 
property of respondents FUNNON T. SHIMMIN, DONNA 
Case No. 
13738 
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SHIMMIN and VERA SHIMMIN and consequently, that 
appellants' claim for an easement by way of necessity over 
the land of respondents JAY L. CRITCHLOW and LOIS 
CRITCHLOW was not applicable and does not exist. The 
court also denied any damage to appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order reversing the court below and 
declaring that appellants do indeed have an easement and 
right of way over respondents' land and that appellants are 
entitled to damages for the blocking thereof by respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant JOHN C. CRITCHLOW and respondent JAY 
L. CRITCHLOW are brothers. Prior to 1971 they operated 
land in the mountains north of Price, Utah, on a partnership 
basis. This land was principally acquired from their father, 
John D. Critchlow, now deceased, who with his two sons 
had operated such land as a grazing unit for many years 
prior to 1971 (TR 8-11; TR 16, 17). In 1971 the District 
Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, in Case No. 9808, 
entered a Decree of Partition dividing such land between the 
two brothers (Defendants' Exhibit 21). As shown on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, the land partitioned to respondent JAY 
L. CRITCHLOW (marked in red on said Exhibit 1) lies to the 
north of that partitioned to appellant JOHN C. CRITCHLOW 
(marked in green on said Exhibit 1). As is evident from 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, the land thus partitioned to respondent 
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and the land partitioned to the appel-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lant JOHN C. CRITCHLOW are not contiguous, but are sep-
arated in part by land marked in yellow on said Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1. This land marked in yellow on said Exhibit now 
belongs to the respondents SHIMMIN. 
Vehicular access to the general area involved in this 
matter from Price, Utah is gained by traveling northwest to 
Helper, Utah; then to Castle Gate, Utah; then northerly 
up Willow Creek toward Duchesne, Utah, nearly to the 
Duchesne County line (see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1); and then 
Southeasterly along a public road called the "Park Road" to 
a point near the northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter 
of Section 17, Township 12 South, Range 11 East, of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 
through 6). This point is designated as "Gate" in the 
northeasterly part of the red area marked on plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1. At this point one leaves the public "Park Road" 
and follows a private road southerly through Sections 20, 
29 and 32 of said Township and Range (note the red and 
yellow areas on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) until access is gained 
to the green area, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, owned by appellants. 
(Section 31 said Township and Range and Section 4 and 5, 
Township 13 South, Range 11 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian) (TR 11-14). It is this private roadway marked on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 and on Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 
(TR 58-63, 242) which is the basis of the dispute between 
the parties. 
Appellants contend that such roadway was used by the 
Critchlows as long ago as 1926 to gain access to the area 
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marked in green on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, partly across their 
own land (red area, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) and partly across 
the area now owned by respondents Shimmin (yellow area, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; TR 11). They maintain that since said 
roadway was used when both the red parcel and the green 
parcel (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) were under common ownership 
to gain access to the area marked in green, a way of necessity 
over the red area in favor of the green area arose upon the 
partition of such areas as above set out. Appellants further 
contend that by reason of such use for longer than twenty 
years over the property now owned by respondents SHIMMIN 
(area marked in yellow, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) appellants have 
effectively established an easement by prescription (R 1-7). 
Respondents claim, and the trial court found, that such 
use as appellants may have made of said roadway over the 
property now owned by respondents SHIMMIN was permis-
sive only, and since no prescriptive right existed over the 
SHIMMIN property, a way of necessity could not arise over 
the property of respondents JAY L. CRITCHLOW and LOIS 
CRITCHLOW, since appellants' property is not contiguous 
thereto (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; R 72-75). 
The CRITCHLOW property now involved was acquired 
between the 1930's and 1943. (TR 8, 9, 76, 285) but the 
father of the Critchlow brothers had other property in the 
general area as early as 1926 (TR 9) and appellant JOHN C. 
CRITCHLOW recalled hauling salt into the red and green 
areas (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) with his father by means of a 
wagon and team as early as 1926 (TR 9, 77, 78, 93). The 
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Shimmin family first acquired an interest in their property 
in 1935 from a man by the name of Charles Peterson (Section 
29) and from a man named Mclntire (Section 32), (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1; TR 14, 223, 238). In 1935 part of the Peterson 
tract (Northeast Quarter of Section 29, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) 
was already under fence, the only part of the property here 
involved which was at that time so enclosed (TR 225). 
Appellants and their witnesses testified that the right of 
way indicated on Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 5 was used 
by appellants over its entire length as above set forth from 
Section 17 to Section 31 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) from 1926 to 
1948 and thereafter, with the first motor vehicle being used 
in 1932 (TR 18, 19,88, 116, 145-147). 
Respondents and their witnesses on the other hand 
testified that no road existed south of "Gate 2" (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1) prior to 1948 (TR 163, 164, 226, 228, 241). 
However, all parties agree that since July of 1948 a 
roadway has existed and been used by appellants over the 
route contended for by the appellants and as indicated on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 5, since at that time, July 
1948, Loren Chidister at the request of several property owners 
in the area including the Critchlows and Foster Shimmin, 
father of respondent FUNNON SHIMMIN, brought a D-4 
caterpillar bulldozer from Section 17 south into Section 5 
for the purpose of building a cow trail from the top of the 
mountain in Section 5, south down Dead Man Canyon (TR 
188-190, 242-246). The south part of appellants' property 
(green area, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) is rugged, steep country and 
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does not permit vehicular access from that direction to the 
northern parts of Sections 4, 5, and 6 and the other property 
of the parties further to the north (TR 35, 80-82, 91, 92, 
103-105, 190, 198), although cattle belonging to the parties 
have been able to drift from the south to the north in the 
spring and from the north to the south in the fall through 
such steep and rugged area (TR 17, 64). 
In 1950 or 1951 appellant JOHN C. CRITCHLOW built 
a fence west from the center of Section 29, which fence 
intersected the roadway in question and at which intersection 
appellant installed a gate (Gate No. 2, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; 
TR 15, 69, 74, 249, 250). Later appellant placed a lock on 
this gate (TR 16, 31, 181, 250) and respondent FUNNON 
SHIMMIN also placed locks on said gate from time to time as 
the locks became broken (TR 249-250). However, in all cases 
all parties were furnished keys to such locks by the other 
(TR 16,32, 187,251). In 1951 or 1952 respondent FUNNON 
SHIMMIN built a fence on the line between Sections 31 and 
32 and placed a gate in that fence line where the roadway in 
question at that time intersected the same (Gate 3, Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1; TR 24, 244) and in 1953 or 1954 respondent 
FUNNON SHIMMIN constructed a fence on the south line 
of Section 32 and placed gates therein at the places where 
said fence line intersected the roadway in question at that 
time (Gates 4 and 5, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; TR 25, 26, 245). 
During or about 1954, respondent SHIMMIN with the con-
currence of appellant JOHN C. CRITCHLOW (TR 27) made 
a slight change in the location of said roadway by grading a 
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road generally parallel to the old one, but on the north side 
of the south line of Section 32 from a point just north of 
Gate 4 to a point just north of Gate 3 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1: 
TR 26-28, 244), which then became the main route traveled 
by appellants across the south end of Section 32 to reach 
their property in Section 31 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; TR 29, 246). 
In the spring of 1972 respondents blocked appellants' 
use of said roadway (TR 31-33, 56, 57, 114, 115) and have 
continued to do so. Appellants, as a result, trucked approxi-
mately 100 head of cattle which they were intending to graze 
on their land in Section 31 (green area, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) 
to Roosevelt, Utah, where they incurred expenses for hauling, 
feeding, treatment and property rental with respect thereto 
(TR 33-46). Appellants were also unable to collect fees for 
deerhunting rights on their property in 1972 (TR 47-51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DECIDING THAT 
APPELLANTS' USE OF SAID ROADWAY AS TO RESPON-
DENTS SHIMMIN WAS PERMISSIVE RATHER THAN 
PRESCRIPTIVE. 
The prescriptive period for acquisition of an easement 
in the State of Utah is twenty years. (Anderson vs. Osguthorpe 
29 Utah 2d 32, 504 P. 2d 1000; Cassity vs. Castagno, 10 
Utah 2d 16; 347 P. 2d 834; Savage vs. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 
197 P. 2d 177; Morris vs. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127). 
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The appellants by their testimony and by that of their wit-
nesses have shown their use of the roadway outlined on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 from 1926 up until the spring of 1972 
(TR 9, 14-18, 69, 72, 73, 86, 116, 145, 147). Even by the 
testimony of the respondents and their witnesses, appellants 
have used the road from July 1948 until the spring of 1972, 
a period of longer than twenty years without interruption 
(TR 246, 280). The findings of fact of the court below do 
not indicate otherwise (R 72-75). The only evidence of any 
alleged interruption was testimony that at one time in 1953 
a party of deerhunters, not including appellant JOHN 
CRITCHLOW by his statement (TR 28, 270), was delayed 
for a short time by a brother of respondent FUNNON 
SHIMMIN while the Shimmin hunting party got ready to take 
off first to hunt the area (TR 274, 275). This alleged tempor-
ary interference, principally by a non-owner of the property, 
certainly did not constitute a legal interruption of appellants' 
use of said road. 
Appellants recognize that their use must be adverse and 
not permissive. However, appellants have clearly shown an 
open, notorious and continuous use of the roadway for 
longer than twenty years. The presumption then arises that 
the use was adverse and the burden is on the respondents 
SHIMMIN to show otherwise (Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 
514, 175 P. 2d 714; Dahnken vs. Romney, 111 Utah 471, 
184 P. 2d 211; Richins vs. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P. 
2d 314.) 
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The evidence is clear from respondents and their wit-
nesses themselves that respondents never at any time hind-
ered, denied, or questioned appellants' use of the road (TR 
264), although appellant JOHN CRITCHLOW was continually 
objecting to respondent FUNNON SHIMMIN about SHIMMIN 
fixing the road (TR 253); although "everytime I'd fix a road, 
John come along and gave me hell about it" (TR 258); 
even though the parties had some serious arguments about 
the road: "They were getting after Funnon pretty good" 
(TR 181); and although appellant JOHN CRITCHLOW 
objected to respondent FUNNON SHIMMIN rerouting a por-
tion of said road (TR 26-29). (Lyman Grazing Association 
vs. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P. 2d 905; Scott vs. 
Weihheimer (Montana), 374 P. 2d 91; 80 A.L.R. 2d 1098). 
In further evidence of appellants' assertion of right, 
appellant JOHN CRITCHLOW himself at one time placed a 
locked gate across the road and gave respondents SHIMMIN 
a key (TR 16, 31, 181, 250); appellants never once sought 
permission from defendants to use the road, but until 1972 
used it as they pleased (TR 19); and respondent SHIMMIN 
recognized said raod, and by providing gates through any 
fences constructed by respondents which intersected said 
road and repeatedly furnishing appellants with keys to any 
locks on said gates (TR 244, 245, 251, 261). 
These actions by the appellants and the reactions on the 
part of the respondents clearly show that appellants' use of 
the road was AGAINST respondents and not UNDER them 
(Zollinger vs. Frank, supra.). 
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The facts of this case distinguish it from the rule followed 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Sdrales vs. Rondos, 
116 Utah 288, 290 P. 2d 562, and Harkness vs. Woodmansee, 
7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291, to the effect that when an owner 
makes a roadway for his own use and another uses the same, 
the burden is then on the user to show that the use is adverse 
rather than permissive. Here there is competent and com-
pelling evidence that the road was in use prior to the time 
respondents SHIMMIN acquired their property (TR 18, 19, 
88, 116, 145, 146, 147) and in addition, the work which 
Loren Chidester did in improving the road with his machine 
in July, 1948 (TR 188-190, 242-256) was actually not re-
quested by respondent SHIMMIN to make a road on 
Shimmin's property, but was incidental to the making of a 
cow trail on the Critchlow property, all of which was as 
much or more paid for by appellants as by respondent 
SHIMMIN according to Chidester's testimony (TR 188, 
196, 197). 
Extablishment of an easement by prescription over the 
property of respondent SHIMMIN is not as far as respondents 
SHIMMIN are concerned in any way related to the matter of 
a way by necessity. Even if appellants had other access to 
their property, which the evidence shows they do not (TR 35, 
80-82, 91, 92, 190, 198, 214), such fact would have no 
bearing on whether or not appellants had acquired an ease-
ment by prescription over the property of respondent 
SHIMMIN (Dahnken vs. Romney, supra.). 
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POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO DE-
CREE THAT APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A WAY 
OF NECESSITY OVER THE PROPERTY OF RESPON-
DENTS CRITCHLOW. 
There is no question that prior to partition the 
Critchlow brothers were the owners in common of both the 
red parcel and the green parcel shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 
and that to get to the green parcel by road it was necessary to 
first cross the red parcel on the roadway as indicated on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 5 (Defendants' Exhibit 21). 
Where land alotted by order of a court in a proceeding 
for partition is so situated that one of the parts would be 
entitled to a way of necessity if an allotment were made by 
deed from all of the other tenants in common, or from a 
common ancestor, the effect of the allotment by order of 
the court is to create a way of necessity (59 American Juris-
prudence 2d 91 7; 28 Corpus Juris Secundum 690; Blum vs. 
Weston (California) 36 P. 778). The trial court in the parti-
tion suit (Defendants' Exhibit 21) did not deny the existence 
of such a way of necessity, but in fact asserted, as shown in 
the transcript of the argument for a new trial (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 16) that if such a roadway was then in existence, the 
same should be recognized. The testimony of all witnesses in 
this case and Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 clearly confirm 
the existence of such roadway at the time of partition. 
Although there was some testimony offered at the trial 
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by the respondents to the effect that appellants could gain 
vehicular access to their property by building roads leading 
from the south, it is patent that first of all appellants have 
no confirmed access to a public road from that direction 
(TR 213, 214) and secondly, the cost of such construction 
would be prohibitive (TR 218, 221, 292, 296, 297). The 
only feasible vehicular access to appellants' property is over 
the easement now claimed by appellants and the necessity 
still exists and will continue to do so. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD 
DAMAGES TO THE APPELLANTS FOR THE BLOCKING 
OF SAID EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY BY RES-
PONDENTS. 
The measure of damages for obstructing an easement is 
the injury sustained by the easement owner through the loss 
of use of the easement during the continuance of the obstruc-
tion. The law also presumes some damage merely from the 
infringement even in the absence of a showing of special dam-
age. (25 American Jurisprudence 2d 525, 28 Corpus Juris 
Secundum 821). In this case the appellants have proved 
special damages in the amount of $1885.71 directly attribut-
able to their loss of use of said roadway by reason of the 
unlawful acts of the respondents (TR 37-49); Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 7-13). 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the court below should be reversed and 
the easement and right of way claimed by the appellants over 
the property of the respondents should be judicially estab-
lished and confirmed and appellants should be awarded their 
proven damages caused by the interference with said right of 
way by the respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Appellants 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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